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Executive Summary 
The process of global regulation of systemically important financial institutions is still in 
full swing. Having completed the regulatory framework for systemically important banks, 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is turning to insurance companies.  
 
In 2013, the FSB designated nine insurance companies as systemically important, and it is 
now in the process of designing systemic regulation for the industry, supported by the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
 
The framework that the FSB has established for insurers closely resembles its framework 
for banks, culminating in the design of capital standards and the calibration of capital 
surcharges. This parallel treatment of banks and insurers is also found in a number of 
important contributions on systemic risk in the academic literature. 
 
This paper challenges this approach. It focuses on the distinct business models and balance 
sheet structures, outlining the main differences and similarities between banks and insurers 
with regard to their interaction with the financial system. 
 
The paper identifies four differences and two similarities. It highlights that: banks are 
institutionally connected with each other through the interbank market, whereas insurers 
are stand-alone operators; banks engage in maturity transformation whereas insurers aim to 
match the duration of assets and liabilities; banks are inherently liquidity-short, whereas 
insurers are inherently liquidity-rich; and banks create money, credit and handle the 
payment system, which insurers do not. The two similarities are that both kinds of 
institutions are financial intermediaries and large-scale investors in financial markets. 
 
The differences underscore the fact that banks have a fundamentally different role within 
the financial system and systemic risk. They can be seen as operating in an “inner circle” 
of the financial system that is given by the banking system, whereas insurers operate in an 
“outer circle”, connected to other financial institutions essentially through their financial 
market investments. 
 
The paper also highlights the fundamental differences between insurers and banks in terms 
of leverage, the role of capital and their capacity for loss absorbency – three critical issues 
for systemic regulation. Leverage is inherent in banking, but quasi-absent in insurance. 
Capital in banking plays an immediate role in case of stress to absorb shocks and retain 
funding capacity; in insurance, capital serves to ensure that the last policy-holders are paid. 
Loss absorbency for banks is essentially limited to equity, but for insurers an additional 
loss absorbency capacity exists in the form of participation by policy-holders, who may 
share part of asset fluctuations and potential losses. 
 
Based on this analysis, the paper raises the question of whether capital surcharges are an 
appropriate instrument for regulating insurers as they may be for banks. Whereas for 
banks, capital surcharges may be helpful in controlling leverage, raising buffers and 
augmenting shock absorption capacity, these effects are not prevalent in insurance. If 
certain issues were to give rise to systemic risk in insurance, other policy tools to address 
these concerns may be more appropriate. 
 
   
3 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Regulation of the insurance industry is entering a new era. The global regulatory 
community under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is contemplating 
regulatory standards for insurance groups that it deems to be of systemic importance. Nine 
insurance groups received this classification by the FSB in 2013, and the design of 
systemic regulation for these groups is now in progress.  
 
The framework that the FSB has rolled out for systemically important insurers is virtually 
identical to its framework for systemically important banks. The identification criteria are 
largely the same, and so are the envisaged policy measures: enhanced group-wide 
supervision; preparation of crisis management tools; and possible higher capital charges 
for some activities. 
 
There may be an inclination to consider institutions that provide financial services to the 
general public, that invest heavily in financial securities and that are publicly listed 
companies as being close to banks. And there may even be a temptation to bring insurance 
and banking closely together from a systemic perspective: after all, do the asset structures 
not resemble each other, and are the liabilities towards policy-holders not somehow 
comparable to those towards depositors? Are the two sectors not also closely 
interconnected through cross-holdings of securities? And would insurance companies not 
have been ‘the next in line’ to fall in the global financial crisis, if the banks had not been 
saved?  
 
These questions overlook the fact that insurance companies have a fundamentally different 
business model and interact with each other and the financial system in a way that is very 
different from banks. Moreover, some of the issues that are at the core of systemic risk 
control – leverage, capital and loss absorbency capacity – are fundamentally different.  
 
This means that applying bank-based or bank-inspired regulation to insurers has the 
potential of being flawed. The fact that prudential regulations for the two sectors – the 
Basel framework on the one hand and the European Solvency II framework or the US 
Risk-Based-Capital framework on the other hand – are entirely different is further 
testimony to the fundamental differences between the two sectors.  
 
The project of systemic insurance regulation raises significant issues for both the industry 
and the regulators. The industry is concerned about the costs of doing business, about 
distortions in the global level playing field – given that European and US accounting and 
regulatory standards are literally continents apart – and about the rising complexity of 
internal financial management, when national and global standards move in different 
directions. 
 
The regulators are concerned about the appropriateness and effectiveness of regulation, and 
about avoiding inconsistency, excessive complexity and competitive distortions. Questions 
of what possible capital implications are meant to achieve, how they would fit with local 
regulatory requirements and how they affect the competitive position of the systemically 
important companies vis-à-vis all other companies are considerations of critical 
importance. 
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Given what is at stake, a number of topics are likely to resurface in the upcoming 
regulatory debate, including those that are seemingly settled; they even include the 
definition of systemic risk, the criteria for designating individual institutions and the 
lessons from the experience of the insurance sector during the crisis. There is still 
confusion about whether the focus of regulation should be on a “firm-to-system” or 
“system-to-firm” perspective in terms of the direction of risk. And it is often unclear 
whether the core concern is systemic risk, i.e. negative spillover between individual 
institutions and the system, or systemic role, i.e. threats to the provision of essential 
services for the financial system or the economy. The policy implications from the various 
approaches are clearly not the same.  
 
This paper aims to clarify some of the main differences and similarities between insurance 
and banking with regard to systemic interaction. It is structured as follows. Section II 
outlines the FSB approach concerning the systemic regulation of insurers and presents the 
main analytical literature that discusses insurance with regard to systemic risk. Section III 
elaborates on the main differences and similarities between banking and insurance with 
regard to systemic interaction, and it develops the different roles of leverage, capital and 
risk absorbency as regards both sectors. Section IV raises some of the broader questions in 
the policy debate that are likely to resurface; and Section V concludes.  
 
 
II. Banks and insurers: business models and systemic regulation  
 
Banks and insurers have different economic functions. Banks create value by maturity 
transformation of deposits and debt into loans and other financial assets, through which 
they provide credit to the economy. Insurers provide risk protection to policy-holders in 
exchange for a premium. They provide such protection through the pooling, diversification 
and management of risk, focusing essentially on life insurance and savings; and property 
and casualty insurance.  
Figure 1. Stylized balance sheet of banks and insurers compared 
 
 
 
Note: Main balance sheet components of the euro area’s aggregated banking system and insurance sector. The size of 
each box corresponds to the relative weight on the balance sheet. The total absolute values shown also include external 
assets and liabilities, fixed assets, and other assets and liabilities that are not represented for the sake of simplicity. A 
unit-linked insurance plan is a type of life insurance where the value of a policy is linked to the net asset value of the 
underlying investment and where customers are allotted units, like in a mutual fund. Source: ECB.  
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In terms of size, the banking sector is typically four to five times as large as the insurance 
sector; in the euro area, banks’ balance sheets amount to 330% of GDP, those of insurers to 
about 70% of GDP. Banks’ debt outstanding in absolute terms is about 15 times as high as 
debt issued by insurers. Banks’ assets are dominated by credit provision; their liabilities, 
by deposits. Insurers’ assets are dominated by financial market investment; their liabilities 
by policy holder liabilities that are also called technical reserves (see Figure 1).  
 
1. Systemic regulation of banks and insurers compared  
 
The FSB designated nine insurance companies as systemically important in mid-2013 and 
has laid out its approach to the regulation of these companies.2 This approach is deeply 
inspired by its framework applied to systemic banks, and follows an identical outline 
(Table 1).  
 
In a first step, systemically important institutions were identified based on their size, 
interconnectedness and the degree of substitutability of their services.3 The global size of 
insurers was measured by the volume of assets, revenues and number of countries served; 
the interconnectedness was measured by the holdings of intra-financial assets and 
liabilities,4 the use of reinsurance, derivatives and other factors. The concepts of 
substitutability and complexity were essentially translated into a new concept of “non-
traditional non-insurance activities (NTNI)”, which included items such as revenues from 
sources other than policy-holders, the provision of financial guarantees, the provision of 
guarantees on certain life insurance products, the use of short-term funding and other 
variables. The definition of this last category is still rather fuzzy and the list of items in this 
category is still changing. Potentially, the coverage is very large. If variable annuities with 
certain life guarantees were included, it would cover a very large share of the US life 
insurance market.  
 
At present, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is charged to 
work out the specifics as regards capital regulation and definition of NTNI-activities, for 
which the first feedback is expected in autumn 2014.  
 
Overall, as virtually all indicators have a volume component, the main factor determining 
the identification was size. It is therefore no surprise that the list of nine identified 
insurance companies corresponds on the whole to the world’s largest insurance companies 
as well as AIG, which, although its business volume had shrunk sharply following the 
crisis, had to be designated for political reasons given its role in the crisis.  
 
The regulatory strategy that the FSB has laid out for the implementation of insurance 
regulation foresees virtually the same three-pronged approach that was applied to banks: 
enhanced supervision at group level; the preparation of risk management and recovery 
                                                            
2 The nine companies are from the European Union (Allianz, Aviva, AXA, Generali and Prudential UK), 
from the United States (AIG, MetLife and Prudential US) and from China (Ping An).  
3 The lesser the degree of substitutability, i.e. the possibility of other institutions taking over the service 
provided by the institution under consideration, the more systemic is its role. Market concentration indices 
are taken as a proxy for the degree of substitutability, reinforcing the size component in the overall 
assessment.  
4 Intra-financial assets are the holding of debt securities issued by other financial institutions (e.g. bank 
bonds); intra-financial liabilities are securities issued by insurance companies and held by other financial 
institutions.  
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plans; and the call for higher capital requirements for NTNI activities that are still to be 
defined.  
 
Table 1. FSB framework for systemic banks and insurers compared 
 
Source: Financial Stability Board (2012, 2013), author’s compilation.  
 
The parallelism between the FSB’s approaches to insurance and banking follows an 
interpretation of the financial crisis, according to which the banking sector was at the heart 
of the problem but the insurance sector would have been ‘the next in line’ if the authorities 
had not put an end to the systemic banking crisis. It is also inspired by the fact that a 
number of insurance companies came under strain and that the company AIG had become 
deeply intertwined with the banking sector through its subsidiary AIG Financial Products, 
which had extended guarantees on financial assets that allowed the banks to minimize their 
capital charge.  
 
2. Systemic risk analysis of banks and insurers  
 
The bulk of the academic literature has also treated insurers and banks largely in parallel. 
The reason is that the most influential papers essentially treat them as institutions trading 
and operating in financial markets and look at them from an investor perspective, rather 
than in terms of their business models. They examine how asset, debt and equity values, as 
well as leverage – generally defined as market value of equity over market value of assets 
– perform over time, differentiating between tranquil periods and periods of stress. The 
papers evaluate how patterns for a single institution evolve vis-à-vis the full sample or the 
market as a whole. It is from this approach that they derive notions of systemic risk.  
 
In this literature on systemic risk that includes insurers, three strands of research stand out.  
 
(1) The CoVaR approach 
 
The first strand is the so-called CoVaR (Conditional value-at-risk) approach, developed by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010). This approach estimates value-at-risk of individual 
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institutions conditional on other institutions experiencing financial distress. The authors 
gauge an institution’s contribution to systemic risk as the increase in the value-at-risk 
across the entire financial sector, conditional on the individual institution being under 
distress. In simple terms, it is the degree to which one institution can put the sector under 
stress.5  
 
As the CoVaR approach focuses on the market values of individual financial institutions 
and does not capture more ‘structural’ parameters of assets and liabilities, such as their 
duration, composition or the underlying investment motive (e.g. trading vs hold-to-
maturity investment), it lends itself to all types of financial institutions, including 
commercial banks, investment banks, insurers and government sponsored enterprises, 
which are all treated on the same footing in the sample. 
 
The authors estimate CoVaR levels over time, including state variables such as market 
volatility, liquidity and credit spreads and the slope of the yield curve, and quantifying the 
extent to which size or leverage of institutions predict systemic risk contribution. They 
generally find that insurance groups display lower systemic risk levels than banks, but 
overall consider them part of the systemic interaction between financial institutions.   
 
(2) Systemic capital shortfall  
 
The second strand of research consists of estimating a ‘systemic expected shortfall’ (SES), 
defined as the propensity for any individual institution to be undercapitalized when the 
system as a whole is under stress. This approach has been developed in the seminal paper 
by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2011), and extended by Brownless and 
Engle (2011) and Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2012). The aim is to estimate the 
recapitalization need of a financial institution resulting from stress in the financial system. 
It can be expressed separately for any individual institution or as the institution’s loss in 
the tail of the aggregate sector's loss distribution, which the authors define as the firm’s 
‘marginal expected shortfall’ (MES), a concept that has become a benchmark of systemic 
risk in the literature. 
 
Using the notation of Brownless and Engle (2011) and Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger 
(2012), who estimate systemic risk values for US and European financial institutions, 
respectively, the expected capital shortfall CS of firm i in case of systemic distress in 
period t is defined as: 
 
   ܥ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ܧ௧ିଵൣ	ߠܣ௜,௧ െ ௜ܹ,௧	|	݀݅ݏݐݎ݁ݏݏ௧	൧,         
(1) 
where Ai and Wi denote the asset and equity values of firm i and  is a prudential ratio of 
equity to assets. As can be seen, such specification can be applied to any financial 
institution for which market values of assets and equity are available and which is traded in 
financial markets. The authors take a very wide sample of financial institutions including 
broker/dealers (i.e. investment banks), commercial banks, insurers and other financial 
institutions. They estimate the capital shortfall resulting from severe financial distress, 
                                                            
5 The difference between the CoVaR value conditional on the institution being in distress and the CoVaR 
value in the ‘normal’ state of the institution yields the marginal contribution of a particular institution to 
systemic risk.  
8 
 
proxying the latter by a large market decline (e.g. 40% decline, or cumulating a set of 
worst trading days in a year).   
 
The authors subsequently define systemic risk as a positive capital shortfall:  
 
    ܴܵܫܵܭ௜ ൌ ܥ ௜ܵ		ሺ݂݋ݎ	ܥ ௜ܵ 	൐ 0ሻ         
(2) 
and consider this measure as each institution’s expected contribution to systemic risk. The 
reasoning is that in periods of severe market distress, a capital shortfall cannot be 
maintained nor easily corrected as no investor will want to inject capital, so that the system 
as a whole comes under strain.  
 
Estimating such systemic risk values for a wide range of financial institutions, the authors 
generally find that investment banks and commercial banks lead the ranking, but they also 
find positive risk values for insurers, even though “insurance firms are overall the least 
systemically risky” (Acharya et al., p. 21). Within the group of insurers, the three insurance 
companies that have the highest risk profile were those heavily involved in providing 
financial guarantees for structured products in the credit derivatives area of the US market. 
Brownless and Engle (2011) find that in terms of cross correlations among the various 
groups of financial firms (covering banks, broker/dealers, other non-depository institutions 
and insurers), “broker/dealers are the most correlated sector, insurance the least, and 
depository banks together with the other group lie in the middle”. 
 
(3) Network approach  
 
The third strand of literature aims at capturing the dynamic network relationship between 
financial institutions. The seminal paper is that by Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon 
(2011), who gauge network relationships in monthly returns of various types of financial 
institutions and examine co-movements through Granger analysis and principal 
components analysis. Their approach estimates empirically the degree and directions of 
connections between financial institutions.  
 
The authors find that between the 1990s and the period 2001-08, the Granger-causalities 
among 100 US financial institutions intensified, raising the stakes of systemic risk, and that 
banks played by far the most important role in transmitting shocks compared with other 
institutions. As regards insurers, their returns are particularly influenced by returns in 
banks and broker/dealers, and influence themselves the returns of both these types of 
institutions and hedge funds. The reason for the significant connectivity of the US 
insurance sector during that period is attributed in large part to the involvement of insurers 
in financial guarantee products.  
 
All these three important strands of research treat financial institutions from the investor 
perspective, examining asset, debt and equity developments over time and across sample. 
Yet a closer look at the business model and balance sheet structure reveals some important 
differences between insurance and banks, especially as regards capital and debt, which will 
be discussed in the subsequent section. As that section will show, while a capital shortfall 
might well represent an immediate source of systemic risk in banking, this is not the case 
in insurance; i.e. in the notation above, equation (1) applies to banking and insurance; 
equation (2) only to banking.  
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III. Banks and insurance in systemic interaction compared  
 
This section elaborates on the main differences and similarities between banks and insurers 
with regard to their systemic interaction. It focuses on their business models and balance 
sheet structures, and discusses the different roles of capital and leverage in banking and 
insurance – two concepts at the heart of systemic regulation.  
 
1. Differences between banks and insurers with regard to their systemic role  
 
a. Institutional interconnectedness 
 
The first key difference between banks and insurers with regard to systemic risk is that 
banks operate within a system, namely the banking system, while insurers do not. Banks 
are institutionally interconnected; they operate through direct balance sheet exposure on 
each other in the form of unsecured and secured interbank lending.  
 
These interconnections are very large, amounting to EUR 5.3 trillion in the euro area or 
60% of GDP.6 These institutional interconnections are large not only for systemically 
important banks. To illustrate this point, take the example of Commerzbank of Germany, 
an ‘average’ large European institution but not on the FSB list: at end-2013, it held on its 
balance sheet EUR 88 billion claims on other banks, of which about one quarter overnight; 
and on the liability side it owed EUR 78 billion to other banks, again with a significant 
share overnight.7  
 
These direct and important interconnections between banking institutions are an intrinsic 
feature of banks’ operating model, and they serve as a protection against the liquidity risk 
that is paramount in banking (Allen and Gale, 2000). It is these direct institutional 
interconnections that establish the “banking system” – a structure of directly interrelated 
parts. The interconnections are highly fungible; they can be shifted, and are shifted, 
frequently among institutions and over the short term; moreover, they are often unsecured, 
essentially depending on trust. These interconnections and their fragility constitute the 
primary channel of transmission of shocks and systemic risk within the banking system.  
 
The fact that there is a “central bank” to which virtually all banks are connected and 
through which they obtain liquidity if needed, is yet a further aspect that demonstrates to 
which degree banks function, and can only function, within a system. The systemic 
interconnection through the central bank can be massive: during the crisis, the ECB lent up 
to €1,100 billion to the euro area banking system.  
 
Insurers are not institutionally interconnected; they are stand-alone operators in 
institutional terms (their interconnection via the financial market will be discussed below). 
For example, there is no direct balance sheet link between the systemically important 
insurance companies. Hence, there exists no “insurance system”, and no “central insurer” 
comparable to a central bank; insurers themselves are not counterparties in liquidity 
                                                            
6 Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, Table 2.1, Aggregate balance sheet of Euro area Monetary Financial 
Institutions (essentially banks). The figure does not include the holdings of securities issued by other banks, 
which amount to an additional EUR 1.6 trillion. 
7 Commerzbank financial reporting, data for end-2013.  
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operations of the central bank. Hence, there is also no direct relationship of contagion 
among insurers as there is for banks.   
 
It is sometimes argued that insurers and reinsurers together constitute a system that 
resembles the banking system. But such a parallel overlooks the functions and size of 
reinsurers. Reinsurers are not first risk-takers at the same level of front-line insurers but act 
as backstop. This means that they are not transmitters but absorbers of risk materialization. 
In addition, the size of the links is far from what it is in banking. Insurers only pass on a 
fraction of their risk to reinsurers so that the linkages between the two levels are relatively 
limited. The world’s largest reinsurer, Munich Re, has a balance sheet of EUR 105 billion,8 
a fraction of the balance sheet of the largest banks or central banks for that matter.  
 
b. Maturity transformation  
 
Banks engage in maturity transformation combined with leverage; they transform short-
term liabilities into longer-term assets. As returns are usually rising with rising duration, 
banks have an incentive to stretch this duration gap outwards, as their expected return rises.  
 
Insurers do not engage in maturity transformation. They pursue a liability-driven 
investment approach, trying to match their asset profile with their liability profile. Asset-
liability management (ALM) is a key function within insurance companies and an 
important strand of insurance economics. As insurers can estimate the duration of 
liabilities and assign probabilities to payouts, they will in principle seek to buy assets with 
a corresponding maturity, which also means that they generally can hold assets to maturity. 
A key measure of risk in insurance companies is the ALM mismatch or duration gap 
between assets and liabilities. A well-run insurance company will have an asset duration 
slightly shorter than its liability duration, in order to keep a liability buffer to face an 
increase in surrenders. Finally, since they are funded long-term, insurers are essentially 
“deep-pocket” investors. This makes them react very differently to downward market 
pressure compared with a short-term funded or leveraged investor.  
 
Related to that is the fact that for insurers the bulk of assets is subject to marking-to-market 
as most of insurers’ assets are quoted on large public markets and are highly liquid. The 
marking-to-market is a key element of Solvency II regulation and already applied by a 
wide range of large insurance companies. For banks, only parts of their financial assets are 
marked to market, whereas their banking book is not. Shocks to financial assets may 
thereby lead to delayed and enhanced reactions on the asset side for banks, once banking 
book valuations need to be adjusted, which is not the case for insurers.  
 
c. Liquidity risk  
 
The second key difference relates to the liquidity risk that is inherent in banking but not in 
insurance. Banks risk being liquidity-short; insurers are liquidity-rich. Deposits are the 
largest items on banks’ balance sheets. For the euro area, they amount to EUR 11 trillion or 
120% of GDP. The largest deposit item are households deposits, amounting to EUR 6.3 
trillion, of which the largest sub-item are overnight deposits amounting to EUR 2.5 trillion. 
No bank has enough buffers to stem such an outflow, and a risk of liquidity shortage can 
                                                            
8 This is the balance sheet value of reinsurance activities, excluding Munich Re’s primary insurer Ergo.  
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quickly translate from one bank to another; systemic risk and contagion usually start from 
liquidity.  
 
Hence, bank liabilities are predominantly short-term, withdrawable at will, and held 
exclusively by trust. Any weakening of such trust and the withdrawal of only a fraction of 
such liabilities would immediately put a bank under stress, have implications on the asset 
and capital structure and cascade through the entire banking system. This is the second key 
channel for the materialization of systemic risk. And even a small decline in deposits or a 
risk thereof, puts bank funding under strain, has an impact on credit provision and 
therefore has the potential to affect the real economy.  
 
Insurance liabilities are less fugitive. The liabilities for insurance of general protection, 
property, casualty and health are not callable at will. They relate to exogenous events that 
policy-holders do not influence.  
 
The part of liabilities that are theoretically callable concerns those parts of life insurance 
business that are not annuities (which cannot be withdrawn early at all). However, there are 
penalties for early withdrawal and tax benefits might vanish. In a crisis, where financial 
and economic uncertainty rise, it is also not evident that policy-holders would cancel life 
insurance policies that give them assurance of future incomes. In the global financial crisis, 
no such withdrawal was visible.  
 
Table 2. Banks and insurers: differences and similarities with regard to systemic interaction 
 
Four differences Two similarities 
  
1. Institutional interconnectedness 1. Financial intermediaries 
Banks are institutionally 
connected through the 
interbank market 
Insurers are stand-
alone operators 
Banks and insurers are financial 
intermediaries between savers 
and investors 
  
 2. Maturity transformation & leverage 2. Financial investors 
Maturity transformation and 
leverage inherent in banking 
 
 
Insurers match asset & 
liabilities; leverage 
quasi-absent 
 
Banks and insurers are large-
scale investors in financial 
markets 
   
3. Exposure to liquidity risk   
Banks face inherent liquidity 
risk 
Insurers are liquidity-
rich 
  
    
4. Role on money, credit and payment system   
Banks create money, credit 
and constitute the payment 
system 
Insurers do not create 
money or credit; they 
use the payment system 
 
  
    
Source: Author’s compilation.  
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d. Money, credit and payment function  
 
The third key difference with regard to systemic risk that is hardly regarded in the 
literature, is that banks deal with the payment function, they create credit and their 
liabilities constitute money. This means that they are a means of payment and entail a 
public good function in a market economy.  
 
Of the entire stock of money within an economy, only a fraction – 10% in the euro area – 
is created by central banks, essentially banknotes. The overwhelming amount of money in 
a modern market economy, essentially consisting of deposits, is held and created by the 
commercial banking sector. For the euro area, the stock of money measured by M3 
amounts to €9.9 trillion, of which 85% are bank deposits (March 2014).  
 
If the function of money and payments is impaired, this has immediate consequences for 
the economy. Banks create money through the credit multiplier process, they are the 
essential component in the monetary policy transmission mechanism and they organize the 
payment function. This is a unique role of the banking system.  
 
Insurers’ liabilities do not constitute money but represent an illiquid financial claim. 
Moreover, insurers do not provide essential financial market utilities and are less integrated 
into the financial market infrastructure. In particular, they are not an organizational part of 
the payments or settlement systems.  
 
2. Similarities between banks and insurers 
 
There are two important similarities between banks and insurers.  
 
a. The role as financial intermediaries  
 
Just like banks, insurers are financial intermediaries as far as their life insurance business 
lines are concerned. Their liabilities represent financial claims for policy holders, and their 
assets are predominantly financial assets. Insurers collect savings, intermediate between 
savers and investors, channel funds and fulfil a function of capital allocation in the 
economy. 
 
They are indeed important sources of funding for the real economy, also as a wide range of 
assets are eligible for them. This includes in particular infrastructure financing, which is 
attractive for insurers because of the long-term and secured nature of the investment. 
Empirically, default rates on infrastructure are significantly lower than on corporate bonds 
for example.  
 
b. The role as investors  
 
Just like banks, insurance companies are large investors in financial markets. They receive 
insurance premia against a promise to cover adverse events and carry savings forward. The 
premia are invested in a diversified portfolio of assets, encompassing government and 
private-sector bonds, equities, loans, infrastructure finance and other assets. Contrary to 
banks, insurers are not primarily lenders but investors, which means that they do not create 
financial claims but primarily purchase financial claims in the market. Insurers do not 
create money and credit, and hence do not fuel credit/debt cycles with risks of bubbles and 
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bursts, and their capacity to add to financial bubbles is limited because they do not build up 
leverage and because their income stream from policy premia is comparatively gradual.  
 
Figure 2. Banks and insurers: stylized balance sheets and systemic linkages  
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
 
As investors, insurers seek a match between assets and liabilities, which is the main 
function of their asset-liability management and as they can choose the assets in view of 
their liability structure, their main concern is credit risk. With new regulation, in particular 
Solvency II, they will however move to a capital standard in which they mark-to-market 
their assets but are allowed to adjust their liability estimates in large part for short-term 
market volatility so that there are not major short-term fluctuations in capital.  
 
Taking the four differences and two similarities combined, insurers just as other non-banks 
are indeed not “funny-looking banks” as already pointed out by Elliott (2013) but they are 
simply not banks at all; they do not interact with the financial system like banks and 
therefore should not be regulated like banks as far as their systemic role is concerned. As it 
has been shown, in terms of financial structure, they are even the ‘contrary’ to banks in 
some dimensions, for example as concerns the asset-liability duration mismatch, the 
absence of liquidity risk and the duration of liabilities themselves. Whereas banks are in 
the business of facilitating leverage for other sectors, insurers are in the business of 
managing risk. This is why banks are more prone to be shock-transmitters, while insurers 
are more prone to be shock-absorbers.  
 
 
3. The roles of leverage, capital and loss-absorption capacity  
 
(1) The role of leverage  
The chief enemy of systemic risk control is leverage. The reason is that it reflects money 
created out of debt and follows cycles with typically much sharper downturns than 
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upturns.9 It is the propensity to finance risky activities by borrowing, which links asset 
returns that are uncertain with obligations that are certain. In tranquil states of the world, 
this strategy is profitable, collecting return premia, but in uncertain states, the relationship 
turns, and leveraged institutions come under strain. If the turn affects a broad range of 
assets and persists, the entire financial system is risking default. Clearly, the high degree of 
leverage in the global financial system was seen as the key factor triggering and 
aggravating the crisis (World Bank, 2009).  
Leverage is inherent in banking and quasi-absent in insurance. “Banking is all about 
leverage”, writes Stefan Ingves, Chair of the Basel Committee for Bank Supervision. 
“Banks are highly leveraged financial institutions that are in the business of facilitating 
leverage for others” (Ingves, 2014, p. 1). While for industrial companies, the share between 
debt and equity funding of assets is typically about 50:50,10 for some banks before the 
crisis, this ratio had been 98:2.  
In economic terms the leverage ratio is mostly defined by the relation of borrowed funds 
over own funds, i.e. debt to equity; yet, it has become convention to define it as assets to 
equity (or its inverse). For banks, this approximation is possible because the share of 
equity-financed assets is small and because on the liability side all what is not equity is 
either financial debt or debt vis-à-vis depositors, which is even shorter term.  
For insurers, the largest liability consists of policy-holder reserves. The fallacy in applying 
a bank leverage ratio to insurance consists of treating policy-holder reserves akin to short-
term financial debt, which they are not. Applying a bank-type leverage ratio would equate 
the banks’ debt-financed purchase of assets with the insurers’ premia-funded purchase of 
assets. The important point is that in insurance, there is a functional link between the two, 
established through an asset-liability management whose objective is to avoid undue 
maturity mismatch. Moreover, insurers do not raise debt to purchase financial assets to 
cover liabilities towards policy-holders.  
Yet, insurers do issue and hold debt. They do so mainly to finance mergers and 
acquisitions, and to a lesser extent to establish a cash buffer if needed or buy fixed assets 
(buildings, etc.). Hence, the main counterparts of insurers’ debt on the asset side are 
goodwill, cash or fixed assets.  
Therefore, for insurers a leverage ratio would better not be defined as equity over assets 
but as equity over debt, or the inverse, which is often referred to as the gearing ratio.11  
If one were to measure the leverage of insurers by relating their equity to their total balance 
sheet, one would only obtain a measure of their business mix: if they write short tail 
business like property, they will have a small balance sheet and the ratio will be low; if 
they write long tail business like annuities, the ratio will be high. Hence, such a ratio would 
reflect their business mix, not their riskiness. 
What is the link with systemic regulation? For banks, capital surcharges can actually 
control leverage because they slow the asset acquisition, also by slowing credit growth; 
                                                            
9 For a fascinating exposition of short and long debt cycles, written by a practitioner and founder of the 
world’s largest hedge fund, see Dalio (2014).  
10 Average of Apple, Exxon Mobil, Google, PetroChina, General Electric, Wal-Mart Stores, IBM, Microsoft, 
Nestlé and Chevron (Ingves, 2014).  
11 In the same vein, rating agencies measure the leverage of insurers by dividing their debt by their equity and 
by comparing their debt to their pre-tax earnings.  
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this is the process of deleveraging. Insurers can reduce the debt gearing but they cannot 
reduce their insurance assets because this would imply to cancel insurance contracts with 
existing policy-holders that is generally not allowed. For these reasons, in the case of 
insurers the notion of leverage, or controlling leverage, is by far not as pertinent as in the 
case of banking. 
 
(2) The role of capital  
 
The linchpin of bank systemic regulation is capital. Higher capital requirements are the key 
policy lever for the control of systemically important banks. Such higher capital 
requirements are effective in addressing systemic risk for banks because in addition to 
restraining leverage, they raise the costs of balance sheet growth and augment the 
immediate loss absorption capacity of individual institutions to shocks, which in turn limits 
the pass-through of such shocks to the system. This is the key reasoning for why higher 
capital requirements are a tool to internalize systemic risk.  
 
Higher capital ratios also help improve a bank’s ratings and access to the funding market. 
All other factors being equal, a bank with higher capital ratios will have better market 
access in particular in periods of stress and is therefore less prone to require recourse to 
public backstops of whatever sort.  
 
The relationship between capital and liquidity risk or depositor protection is only indirect. 
Liquidity risk is addressed by specific regulation, such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in 
Basel III, and the prime tool for depositor protection are deposit insurance schemes. 
However, to the extent that liquidity risks are beginning to materialize, for example by an 
incipient withdrawal of deposits, capital can help stem an initial outflow by helping to tap 
market funding or central bank recourse, for which sufficient capital levels are a 
precondition. While robust capital levels do not protect depositors directly, they can be 
seen as providing a first protection against deposit outflows or other liquidity shortages.  
 
In insurance, capital has a very different role (for an excellent overview see Platin and 
Rochet, 2007). It serves essentially to ensure that the last policy-holder is being paid. First 
all assets are wound down, which typically can take many years,12 and to be sure that there 
enough assets to cover eventually all liabilities also under adverse market conditions, 
regulators demand more assets than liabilities from the outset, which is what establishes 
capital. Hence, whereas in banking, capital enters the sequence of adverse events at the 
beginning, in insurance it enters the sequence of adverse events at the end.  
 
This difference has an important implication for systemic regulation because it changes the 
effectiveness of capital surcharges. Raising capital levels for banks increases their buffer to 
withstand shocks and therefore helps avoid that a chain of systemic contagion unravels. It 
also reduces the likelihood of adverse shocks ex ante, by reducing leverage, and thus the 
propensity to cycles of bubbles and crashes.13 
                                                            
12 UK Equitable, for example, had to be wound down and has been in runoff for years. Policy-holders are 
served from the asset pool just as if the insurance company was active. 
13 There is another fundamental point regarding the role of capital in prudential regulation. Policy holder 
protection can be enhanced through demanding more capital on top of calculated technical reserves, or by 
strengthening the demands on the calculation of reserves themselves. Continental European supervisors have 
traditionally focused their attention on the adequacy of technical reserves, which represent 90% or more of 
liabilities, whereas UK or US supervisors have focused more on capital. It is important to recall that the 
prime emphasis of insurance supervision should be on the adequacy of technical reserves or provisions 
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Raising capital for insurers, in contrast, essentially means that there are (even) more assets 
available to cover the liability stream than otherwise, but such additional capital will be 
consumed, if at all, at the end of the process and has no crisis prevention or stabilization 
function.  
 
Regulators recognize this important difference and therefore envisage requiring more 
capital only for so-called ‘non-traditional’ insurance activities. Depending on the ultimate 
definition, the scope may represent a significant share of insurers’ balance sheets and be 
not far from overall capital surcharges applied to banks. These activities have not yet been 
conclusively defined; so far, several compilations exist, listing mainly variable annuity 
products with certain guarantees, financial guarantee products, securities lending, and other 
activities. 
 
Interconnectedness is also a concern to regulators and is sometimes considered to be 
addressed through higher capital requirements, to reduce the degree of interconnectedness. 
Obviously, if capital surcharges were prohibitive, such activities could not be undertaken. 
But short of being prohibitive, capital surcharges may not be effective; hence, if an activity 
– in the form of ‘non-traditional’ or in the form giving rise to unwarranted 
interconnectedness – were to give rise to systemic risk, measures other than capital 
surcharges may be more appropriate to address them. Only such other measures, and not 
capital surcharges, would have been effective in preventing the AIG debacle, resulting 
from an unregulated financial subsidiary in London engaging in financial guarantees and 
credit enhancements of subprime products. Eventually, AIG required $180 billion in 
support from the Federal Reserve and US Treasury. This is yet another illustration of how 
unrealistic effective – or, put differently, how ineffective realistic – capital surcharges 
would be.  
 
This, however, requires a very careful definition in the first place so as to avoid wrongly 
classifying insurance products with certain guarantee components that provide an 
important value for policy-holders and society at large (and whose guarantees can be 
hedged). It also requires not confusing the use of derivatives for hedging purposes with 
that for engaging in leverage.  
 
For example, one source of interconnectedness is identified as the holding of bank bonds 
by insurers (IAIS, 2013). Applying higher capital charges related to such securities’ 
holdings would indeed lower their return but not eliminate such interconnectedness. And 
higher capital charges would also not stem the potential unravelling of such 
interconnectedness through the potentially rapid sales of such bonds in the case of a crisis. 
If cross-sector holdings were a major concern, such holdings could be limited as a share of 
the balance sheet, rather than being made more expensive. Having said that, it should be 
noted that the problem of cross-holdings of securities across the two sectors was not 
identified as an issue in the regulation of banks and did not lead to limits or surcharges 
there.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
themselves, less on capital, as the latter is merely an additional buffer in case reserves have been 
underestimated. 
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(3) Loss absorption capacity  
There is a third factor that has a bearing on the absorption of systemic risk, and which this 
time is specific for insurance. For banks, the loss absorbency on the liability side is mostly 
confined to the equity tranche. There have been recent market and regulatory initiatives to 
raise the degree of loss absorption through debt contracts converting into equity 
(conditional convertibles) and through the formalization of bail-in rules allowing for the 
write-down of subordinated debt. In Europe, this is foreseen in the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive that is currently in the final stages of legal adoption. The double 
motivation of these steps is to limit the pass-through from shocks to individual institutions 
to the system and to protect even more effectively the depositors.  
In insurance, the bail-in is built in: there is an inherent loss absorption capacity in the form 
of beneficiary participation in a significant part of life insurance contracts. In these 
contracts policy-holders participate in the gains and losses of the investment linked to their 
policies. Hence, there is a built-in loss absorbency function in insurance on top of the 
equity tranche. 
The loss absorbency resulting from participating contracts does not affect all policy-holder 
reserves. Property and casualty insurance contracts are all excluded; policy-holders need 
the same damage protection independent of investment performance. The loss absorption 
concerns specific life insurance contracts allocated to the insurers’ ‘General account’ that 
are prevalent in most countries, and they apply to insurance contracts of so-called unit 
linked accounts. Loss absorption is quite significant and likely to amount to between one 
third and one half of life insurance underwriting of an average European insurer. This loss 
absorption limits the propensity for ‘fire sales’ feared by authorities as one issue of 
interconnectedness. For example, in the Greek debt restructuring, about 80% of the losses 
of some European insurance companies were passed through to policy-holders.  
Hence, insurers have achieved what is currently considered for banks, a partial loss 
absorption capacity of liabilities beyond equity, i.e. a form of bail-in. 
IV. Broader questions about systemic regulation  
 
Differences in business model and balance sheet structure, especially with regard to capital 
and leverage, are key to understanding the differences in the systemic interaction of banks 
and insurers with the rest of the financial system. But there are also other key issues still 
open.  
 
Even though there is not a single dominant definition of systemic risk, there is a broad 
common understanding of the concept (for a recent overview, see Eling and Pankoke, 2012). 
This can be summarized as the risk of system-wide distress and economic damage. The 
system-wide distress has sometimes been defined as the failure of a significant part of 
financial institutions (Acharya et al., 2011; De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000); as correlated 
defaults of financial institutions over a short period of time (Billio et al., 2010); as an 
impairment of the financial system (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011); as the 
malfunctioning of the entire financial system (Bach and Nyuyen, 2012; Rodriguez-Moreno 
and Pena (2013); or as the loss of economic value or widespread loss of confidence in the 
financial system (Baur et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2013; Cummins and Weiss, 2011 and 2013; 
Weiss and Mühlnickel, 2013). 
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The economic fallout has been consistently described as a negative effect on credit supply, 
withdrawal of liquidity or negative effects on the economy. As these terms illustrate, the 
main focus has been on banking, and less on non-bank financial institutions.  
 
There are still a number of open questions that will resurface in the debate about insurers. 
These are all issues that warrant close considerations in the period ahead and many of them 
still need clarification.  
 
1. Which system and which channels of transmission?  
 
What is the system that the notion of systemic risk actually refers to? The preceding 
section has shown that the answer “the financial system” is no longer sufficiently granular 
because of different types of financial institutions and fundamentally different types of 
interactions among them.14 In particular, for the reasons discussed above, banks can be 
seen as representing a “system within the system”, and the transmission of shocks within 
this “inner circle” constituted by the banking system is fundamentally different compared 
with other financial institutions in the “outer circle”.  
 
The distinction between the banking system as inner circle and non-bank financial 
institutions in an outer circle, linked to the financial system mainly through their financial 
market investments is consistent with a number of empirical findings. The large and 
potentially vulnerable interconnections within the banking system have motivated recent 
research to use network analysis to capture these interconnections and analyze the channels 
of systemic risk (European Central Bank, 2010; Halaj and Kok, 2013). These studies cover 
only banks and explain how interbank interactions can be described as a network. In their 
study of interconnectedness, which includes several types of institutions, Billio et al. 
(2012) find that banks play by far the most important role in transmitting shocks compared 
with other institutions.  
 
Therefore, when it comes to designing regulatory measures, the generic description of 
systemic risk needs to be complemented by an analysis of transmission channels. Such 
analysis must encompass three steps: identifying the source of vulnerability; elaborating 
channels of transmission to other financial institutions; and elaborating the transmission to 
the real economy.  
 
For banks these three steps can broadly be described as follows. First, the primary source 
of vulnerability is given by the combination of fugitive liabilities combined with stickier 
long-term assets as a result of maturity transformation; it is thus liquidity risk that can 
trigger solvency risks. Second, their transmission to the banking system predominantly 
occurs through the institutional interconnectedness to other banks which are short-term, 
callable at will and largely based on trust. Third, the transmission to the real economy can 
occur through a combination of a fall in the trust in the safety of deposits, disruptions to the 
payment function of money, and/or the credit provision. The fact that banks are investors 
in financial markets and financial intermediaries can aggravate the transmission of 
financial risk, but they are dwarfed in importance by the bank’s specific channels listed 
earlier. 
 
                                                            
14 Zigrand (2014) provides an insightful and comprehensive analysis of systems in finance and economics.  
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For insurers, none of the bank-specific channels apply. Liabilities represent no means of 
payment, are less fugitive and mostly longer-term, assets are broadly matched and 
institutional interconnectedness is not given. The sole potential channel of transmission is 
in the role of financial intermediary and investor. Here, an insurer like any large investor, 
facing challenges in asset management, might be able to contribute to strain in the financial 
system. If that is the case, the solution to containing risk may lie less in the nature of the 
institution than in the nature and functioning of financial markets or the nature of the 
accounting.15 In any event, the issue of transmission channels of insurance-originated 
systemic risk is still open.  
 
2. Which direction of risk?  
 
There is still confusion whether the focus is on a “firm-to-system” or “system-to-firm” 
perspective, or both. Yet, the policy implications of the two perspectives are not identical.  
 
The first perspective concentrates on the risk that the failure of a firm causes system 
distress; the second one, on the risk that a firm cannot withstand systemic stress and would 
require recapitalization, which in stressed market conditions may not be available and then 
cascade onto the system. Policy-makers mostly focus on the first perspective, researchers 
mostly on the second one.  
 
The discussion about systemically important banks focuses strongly on the “firm-to-
system” perspective. It is related to the fear that some institutions are too-big-to-fail 
because their failure would cause widespread distress to the financial system. For insurers, 
the debate has mostly focused on the possibility of fire sales. Yet, the risks that insurers are 
exposed to, is not correlated with capital market risks but rather lies in the areas of natural 
catastrophes, questions in the life insurance model during periods of low interest rates or 
other drain on insurers’ liquidity. Hence, there is no clear firm-to-system channel.  
 
Insurers can hypothetically be subject to liquidity withdrawals although these are only 
partly possible and, to the extent that they are possible, they are likely to be rather gradual. 
They are only partly possible because a large fraction is linked with adverse events in 
property and casualty insurance that policy-holders will not inflict on themselves; they are 
likely to be rather gradual since cancellations of life insurance contracts are often not in the 
interest for policy-holders as they would lose the benefit for which they took the insurance 
in the first place, be it for annuities, a benefit for their survivors or a tax advantage. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the overall process is far more orderly than in the case of 
banks.  
 
3. Systemic risk or a systemic role? 
 
There is also still a need of clarification whether the focus is on systemic risk, i.e. negative 
spillovers between individual institutions and the system, or on systemic roles, i.e. the 
provision of essential services in the financial system or the economy. The latter implies 
that systemically important institutions are those whose viability is deemed crucial for the 
                                                            
15 In the last two equity market crises (2002-03 and 2008-09) the marking-to-market of assets (in IFRS and 
US-GAAP), combined with the stress tests applied to insurers by regulators and supervisors in times of 
market distress, have had a procyclical effect in forcing insurers to sell holdings of equities to protect their 
solvency, whereas in previous crises they were more able to act as holder of long-term assets of last resort.  
20 
 
functioning of the financial system and/or economy. Again, policy implications from the 
two approaches are not the same.  
 
It is clear that that insurance companies provide an important service to the real economy. 
They help firms, households and public sector entities to manage risks they face, including 
the support to households on long-term income through life insurance products. It is less 
evident that insurance companies provide a systemic service within the financial sector 
more broadly such as market infrastructures do or as banks do in the payment system. 
Therefore, the systemic importance for the economy may be more straightforward to 
identify than the systemic importance for the financial system. The financial system would 
function without insurers, the economy would not.  
 
 
V. Conclusion  
To understand the difference between banking and insurance, one has to start from the 
liability side of the balance sheet and, more specifically, from the comparison of bank 
deposits with insurance liabilities. Bank deposits represent a ‘monolithic’ block of 
homogenous claims whose predominant maturity is zero; insurance liabilities represent a 
set of highly heterogeneous claims whose average maturity is several years. In the first 
case, an expectation of withdrawals or payouts over time cannot be formed; in the latter 
case, actuarial methods have at their heart the calculation of expected runoffs. 
 
Several consequences follow from this important distinction, including that insurers can 
conduct asset-liability management to harmonize their asset and liability structures, and 
focus mostly on longer-term and hold-to-maturity investments. This is very different from 
banks, which seek returns through maturity transformation.  
 
This paper has aimed at elaborating the main differences and similarities between 
insurance and banking with regard to systemic interaction and highlighted the differences 
in institutional interconnectedness, liquidity risk, payments function and maturity 
transformation. It has also elaborated on the different roles of leverage and capital between 
both sectors. In contrast with banking, capital in insurance serves directly the protection of 
the last policy-holders, and it serves much less to desire to access capital markets to fund 
asset purchases or obtain temporary liquidity support, nor does it serve the controlling of 
leverage. 
 
Therefore, the paper has raised the question of whether capital surcharges motivated by 
fears of systemic risk would have a justification in insurance as they may have in banking. 
In case certain activities gave rise to systemic risk, the question therefore arises whether 
regulatory responses other than capital surcharges would be more appropriate. Such 
responses would have to be targeted at the activities under consideration and might range 
from prohibitions, e.g. of activities providing financial guarantees as did AIG, investment 
limits (e.g. if the holding of bank bonds was a concern due to interconnectedness) or 
changes to the design of insurance contracts (e.g. on withdrawal limits to slow a possible 
sudden withdrawal over time). Also consolidated solvency capital requirements and 
supervision by the supervisor of the group holding company, which still does not exist in 
the US, would be relevant measures. 
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More broadly, the paper has aimed at highlighting the different roles of banks and 
insurance in the financial system and their different degrees of interaction with that system. 
These differences are fundamental. The reason is that banks are constitutive of the 
financial system in general and the payment system in particular; the financial system 
cannot be conceived without banks. Insurers use the financial system as well as the 
payment system, but the system can exist and function without them. 
 
These relationships are different as far as the economy is concerned: both banks and 
insurers are essential for modern market economies, whose functioning cannot be 
envisaged without either of them: banks for their role in the handling of money and 
payments, and the extension of credit; insurers for their role in the management of risk.  
 
Banks are often equated with financial institutions and therefore “systemic risk in the 
financial system” is mostly meant to mean the banking system. It is therefore a logical 
fallacy to conclude that insurers, being financial institutions, are part of the systemic risk 
sources and channels just like banks.  
 
Insurers no doubt have a systemic role for the functioning of the economies; whether they 
can indeed originate and create systemic risk in the financial system is an issue that is still 
to be demonstrated. The comprehensive systemic risk study by the US Treasury’s Office of 
Financial Research stresses the importance of four L’s in systemic crises: linkages, 
liquidity, leverage and losses (Bisias et al. 2012). This paper has tried to demonstrate that 
these four issues need to be conceived in a fundamentally different way in insurance than 
in banking.  
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